Archive for May 6th, 2011

Ron Paul hauls in more than a $1 million

Ron Paul hauls in more than a $1 million (looks like we aren’t the only ones fed-up of the neocon warmongering agenda!)
 

Review of Transparent Cabal by David Lutz

Review of Transparent Cabal by David Lutz

Friday, May 6, 2011 8:25 AM
From: “Stephen Sniegoski”

Friends,

Review of Transparent Cabal by David Lutz

There are still a few reviews of and references to my book “The Transparent Cabal: The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel.” 

http://www.amazon.com/Transparent-Cabal-Neoconservative-National-Interest/dp/1932528172

A favorable and informative review was written by Dr. David W. Lutz, Senior Lecturer at The Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Nairobi, Kenya, which came out in the journal “Critical Studies on Terrorism,” Vol. 3, No. 3 (December 2010).

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=t780786797~tab=issueslist

David W. Lutz, Ph.D., graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1978 and served in the U.S. Army until 1983. In 1994 he received his Ph.D. in moral philosophy from the University of Notre Dame. He has held post-doctoral research positions at the University of St. Thomas in Minnesota and the Hanover Institute of Philosophical Research in Germany. Dr. Lutz currently teaches philosophy and management at The Catholic University of Eastern Africa in Nairobi, Kenya. He is the author of the article  “UnJust War Theory: Christian Zionism and the Road to Jerusalem,” in the book “Neo-Conned! Again.” 

http://www.amazon.com/Neo-Conned-Again-Hypocrisy-Lawlessness-Rape/dp/1932528059

Review of The Transparent Cabal, “Critical Studies on Terrorism,”  Vol. 3, No. 3 (December 2010), pp. 467-470.

http://home.comcast.net/~transparentcabal/review16.html

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=t780786797~tab=issueslist

Stephen J. Sniegoski, The Transparent Cabal: The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel, Foreword by Paul Findley, Introduction by Paul Gottfried, Norfolk, Virginia: Enigma Editions, 2008, xvi + 447 pages

By David W. Lutz, The Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Nairobi, Kenya

The thesis of Stephen J. Sniegoski’s carefully-researched and persuasively-argued book is that the primary aim of the calamitous invasion of Iraq in 2003 was not to avenge an assassination plot against the President’s father, to liberate the Iraqi people, to combat terrorist threats to US security, to enhance US global power, to spread democracy, nor to control oil reserves, but rather to improve the strategic position of Israel: “The origins of the American war on Iraq revolve around the United States’ adoption of a war agenda whose basic format was conceived in Israel to advance Israeli interests and was ardently pushed by the influential pro-Israeli American neoconservatives, both inside and outside the Bush administration” (p. 351). Sniegoski’s assertion is not that the “neocons” deliberately promoted Israel’s interest at the expense of the United States, but rather that they “viewed American foreign policy in the Middle East through the lens of Israeli interest, as Israeli interest was perceived by the Likudniks” (p. 5).

Sniegoski explains: “The aim of the neoconservative/Likudnik foreign policy strategy was to weaken and fragment Israel’s Middle East adversaries and concomitantly increase Israel’s relative strength, both externally and internally. A key objective was to eliminate the demographic threat posed by the Palestinians to the Jewish state, which the destabilization of Israel’s external enemies would achieve, since the Palestinian resistance depended upon external support, both moral and material” (p. 5). Although the neocons saw an identity of interests between the United States and Israel, the countries’ respective interests did not in fact coincide. The United States stood to benefit from stability in the Middle East, so that the flow of oil would not be interrupted; Israel would gain relative strength from instability.

The neoconservatives are a group of Americans (some with strong ties to Israel) who became dissatisfied with socialism and moved to the “right”. One of the founding fathers of neoconservatism, Irving Kristol, who was a self-described “Trotskyist” during his student days at the City College of New York, explains: “Karl Marx once wrote that the human race would eventually face the choice between socialism and barbarism. Well, we have seen enough of socialism in our time to realize that, in actuality as distinct from ideality, it can offer neither stability nor justice, and that in many of its versions it seems perfectly compatible with barbarism. So most neoconservatives believe that the last, best hope of humanity at this time is an intellectually and morally reinvigorated liberal capitalism” (Reflections of a Neoconservative, p. 77). In other words, neocons are “conservative” in the sense that they are conserving liberalism.

Among the more important neocons are Irving Kristol and his wife Gertrude Himmelfarb and their son William Kristol, Norman Podhoretz and his wife Midge Decter and their son John Podhoretz, Elliott Abrams, Kenneth Adelman, John Bolton, Max Boot, David Brooks, Stephen Bryen, Stephen Cambone, Mona Charen, Eliot Cohen, Eric Edelman, Douglas Feith, David Frum, Frank Gaffney, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Jonah Goldberg, John Hannah, Robert and Frederick Kagan, Max Kampelman, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Charles Krauthammer, Michael Ledeen, Lewis Libby, William Luti, Edward Luttwak, Joshua Muravchik, Laurie Mylroie, Richard Perle, Richard and Daniel Pipes, Danielle Pletka, Michael Rubin, Randy Scheunemann, Gary Schmitt, Stephen Schwartz, Abram Shulsky, Max Singer, Kenneth Timmerman, Paul Wolfowitz, James Woolsey, David and Meyrav Wurmser, and Dov Zakheim. They have worked within an interlocking network of think tanks (including the American Enterprise Institute, the Center for Security Policy, the Hudson Institute, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, the Middle East Forum, the Middle East Media Research Institute, and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy), as writers for neocon publications such as Commentary and The Weekly Standard, as syndicated columnists, in academe and/or in government.

Sniegoski examines the origins of the strategy of destabilizing Israel’s neighbors within the history of Zionism, including the Revisionist Zionism of Ze’ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky. In 1982, Oded Yinon wrote in “A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s”, which was published in Kivunim, the journal of the World Zionist Organisation: “Lebanon’s total dissolution into five provinces serves as a precedent for the entire Arab world including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula and is already following that track.” But one of the lessons learned from Menachem Begin’s disastrous 1982 invasion of Lebanon was that future campaigns to strengthen Israel’s strategic position would have to be viewed by Americans as in US national interest. Therefore, one of the challenges of the Israeli right and their neoconservative allies was to persuade Americans that Israeli and American interests coincide.

The Iraq war “cabal” was “transparent”, because the neocons’ strategy was laid out in publicly-available documents. In 1996, a study group headed by Perle and including other neoconservatives produced a paper entitled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm”, which was published by the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, an Israeli think tank. Sniegoski comments: “The ‘realm’ that the study group sought to secure was that of Israel. The purpose of the policy paper was to provide a political blueprint for the incoming Israeli Likud government of Benjamin Netanyahu. The paper stated that Netanyahu should ‘make a clean break’ with the Oslo peace process and reassert Israel’s claim to the West Bank and Gaza. It presented a plan by which Israel would ‘shape its strategic environment,’ beginning with the removal of Saddam Hussein and the installation of a Hashemite monarchy in Baghdad…. It should be emphasized that the same people – Feith, Wurmser, Perle – who advised the Israeli government on issues of national security would later advise the George W. Bush administration to pursue virtually the same policy regarding the Middle East” (p. 90).

The neocons came to power with the election of President George W. Bush. Although Bush himself was remarkably weak in the area of foreign policy, the neocons’ agenda agreed with his Evangelical Protestant and Christian Zionist beliefs. Vice President Cheney, although not himself a neoconservative, had strong connections with the neocons and brought many of them into the new administration. The attacks of September 2001 offered the neocons an opportunity to implement their war agenda: “Traumatized as they were by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the American people were ready to believe stories of the most extreme nature” (p. 172). The neocons then shifted the aim from Afghanistan to Iraq, because the former was not and the latter was part of their pre-9/11 agenda. The “war on terrorism” focused on the “axis of evil” – Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and especially the first two – not on those responsible for the 2001 attacks. One of the tactics used by the neocons to persuade the American government and people to focus on Iraq was blurring the distinction between intelligence and propaganda.

Sniegoski does not make the obviously false claim that a small group of neocons launched a war against the will of the American people: “The neocons were the driving force for war, but they could not have achieved success if their agenda did not in some way or other resonate with a significant number of Americans” (p. 331). President Bush was receptive to the neocons’ propaganda, because it gave him a personal mission: to stand firm against an evil enemy. Among other supporters of the invasion of Iraq were Christian Zionists, war profiteers, former Cold Warriors, Republican partisans, some members of the liberal elite, and many ordinary Americans who wanted action to be taken in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks (and who, in many cases, could not distinguish between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein).

Writing this book was an act of courage, because observing that “the entire neocon Middle East agenda originated in Israel as a means of advancing Israel’s geostrategic interests” (p. 331) leads inevitably to accusations of anti-Semitic conspiracy-mongering. Sniegoski anticipates and meets the accusation: “The ‘anti-Semitic’ charge is often an effort, and usually a very effective effort, to silence public discourse on issues displeasing to some influential Jews. But it is necessary to move away from the question as to whether the argument (in fact, any argument) is ‘anti-Semitic,’ to the question of whether it is true” (p. 372). This book has, in fact, nothing to do with anti-Semitism. Although most neocons are Jews, most Jews are not neocons. Many Zionists are not Jews and many Jews are not Zionists. To equate anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism is irrational. Sniegoski cites polls indicating that the percentage of American Jews that supported the war was less than the percentage of the entire American population that supported it. It would be appropriate for those who disagree with Sniegoski not to hurl the charge of anti-Semitism against him, but instead to engage his argument and examine the evidence.

A theme recurring throughout the book is that the neocons maintained the identity of American and Israeli interests, when those interests were in fact far from identical. Sniegoski writes, near the conclusion of the book: “Individuals with close ties to foreign states should not be shaping American policy in areas dealing with those foreign states’ interests. This is a clear conflict of interest. None of this is intended to mean that the United States should not be concerned about international morality – with identical standards applied to all countries – but the United States cannot be expected to pursue policies which might increase the security of particular foreign states at the expense of the interests of the United States” (p. 373). One noteworthy characteristic of the debate about the war against Iraq is the almost total absence of considerations of international morality. Although Plato and Aristotle understood politics as ethics writ large, American foreign policy has more to do with Machiavelli and Bismarck than with the philosophia perennis.

One might make a decision about whether to invade another country in terms of the just war tradition, with its criteria of jus ad bellum (justice in going to war) and jus in bello (justice in fighting a war). Instead, the United States usually makes such decisions in terms of the criterion of Realpolitik: Is it in the national interest? The war against Iraq was an exception, however, because it was fought in the interest of a foreign country. Sniegoski explains how the neocons supplanted the traditional foreign policy and national security elite, including James Baker, Brent Scowcroft and Colin Powell. But it is unfortunate that the only viable alternative to the neocons’ agenda was “realism”.

Promoting the national interest would be consistent with moral foreign policy, if the national interest were not reduced to economic interest. Just as it is in no one’s true personal interest to kill an innocent person for financial gain, it is in no nation’s true interest to promote its economic growth by fighting an unjust war. The true national interest of the United States includes promoting justice in international relations, which involves opposing the false belief that nations are justified in starting wars whenever it is in their economic interest to do so. Sniegoski’s book shows how wrong the United States can be when international morality is disregarded.

Sniegoski points out that, in addition to the old foreign policy establishment: “Many American military leaders also opposed the U.S. attack on Iraq. Even members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff initially expressed their opposition to initiating war” (p. 346). These military professionals were right to oppose the war, because it violated the ethics of their profession. But why did not a single senior officer refuse the order to participate in this immoral war? Although there is no question but that the President is Commander-in-Chief of the nation’s armed forces, there is also no question that members of the armed forces are obligated not to obey unethical orders. If this was true in My Lai, Vietnam in 1968 when the unethical order was given by a lieutenant to sergeants and privates, then it was also true in Washington and Iraq in 2003 when the unethical order was given by a president to generals and admirals.

Because the officers were obedient, the United States and a few allies fought a war that was extremely costly to the United States. Thousands of American soldiers were killed and tens of thousands wounded. A colossal sum of money was spent by a government already suffering from huge, chronic budget deficits. And the threat of terrorism was increased, not decreased. The cost to the Iraqi people was far greater, with several hundred thousand casualties. But from the perspective of the Israeli right, the war was a success. The objective of weakening and fragmenting Iraq was accomplished – with the blood of American and British soldiers.

Although the neocons’ preferred candidate, John McCain, was not elected in 2008, with the consequence that the neocons no longer hold key government positions, they are still alive and quite active. As Sniegoski makes the point, “One thing that definitely can be said is that while there is a long history behind neocons’ Middle East policy, that policy – and the neocons themselves – are far from becoming history” (p. 382). In the May 2009 issue of Commentary, Norman Podhoretz criticized President Obama for being soft on Iran: “In making the ridiculous boast during his presidential campaign that he could talk Iran into giving up its quest for nuclear weapons (and the missiles to deliver them), Obama was careful to add that the military option remained available in case all else failed. But everyone, and especially the Iranians and the Israelis, had to know that this was pro forma, and that if elected Obama would pursue the same carrot-and-stick approach of the Europeans who had been negotiating with Iran for the past five years. He would do this in spite of the fact that the only accomplishment of the European diplomatic dance had been to buy the Iranians more time…. Admit it or not, then, the awesome choice of bombing Iran or letting Iran get the bomb is hard upon us.” We need to decide whether we should let the neocons talk us into another unjust war, or whether the time has come to fight terrorism by working for justice in the Middle East.

David W. Lutz, The Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Nairobi, Kenya

Website:

http://home.comcast.net/~transparentcabal/

Amazon Link for The Transparent Cabal:

http://tiny.cc/zNV06

Best,

Stephen Sniegoski

 

The cost of bin Laden: $3 trillion over 15 years

http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_exclusive/20110506/pl_yblog_exclusive/the-cost-of-bin-laden-3-trillion-over-15-years

The cost of bin Laden: $3 trillion over 15 years (so US support for Israel cost US this much more)

By National Journal national Journal Fri May 6, 8:12 am ET

By Tim Fernholz and Jim Tankersley
National Journal

The most expensive public enemy in American history died Sunday from two bullets.

As we mark Osama bin Laden’s death, what’s striking is how much he cost our nation—and how little we’ve gained from our fight against him. By conservative estimates, bin Laden cost the United States at least $3 trillion over the past 15 years, counting the disruptions he wrought on the domestic economy, the wars and heightened security triggered by the terrorist attacks he engineered, and the direct efforts to hunt him down.

What do we have to show for that tab? Two wars that continue to occupy 150,000 troops and tie up a quarter of our defense budget; a bloated homeland-security apparatus that has at times pushed the bounds of civil liberty; soaring oil prices partially attributable to the global war on bin Laden’s terrorist network; and a chunk of our mounting national debt, which threatens to hobble the economy unless lawmakers compromise on an unprecedented deficit-reduction deal.

All of that has not given us, at least not yet, anything close to the social or economic advancements produced by the battles against America’s costliest past enemies. Defeating the Confederate army brought the end of slavery and a wave of standardization—in railroad gauges and shoe sizes, for example—that paved the way for a truly national economy. Vanquishing Adolf Hitler ended the Great Depression and ushered in a period of booming prosperity and hegemony. Even the massive military escalation that marked the Cold War standoff against Joseph Stalin and his Russian successors produced landmark technological breakthroughs that revolutionized the economy.

Perhaps the biggest economic silver lining from our bin Laden spending, if there is one, is the accelerated development of unmanned aircraft. That’s our $3 trillion windfall, so far: Predator drones. “We have spent a huge amount of money which has not had much effect on the strengthening of our military, and has had a very weak impact on our economy,” says Linda Bilmes, a lecturer at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government who coauthored a book on the costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars with Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz.

(TIMELINE: Obama’s big secret. When he knew about bin Laden (and we didn’t)

Certainly, in the course of the fight against bin Laden, the United States escaped another truly catastrophic attack on our soil. Al-Qaida, though not destroyed, has been badly hobbled. “We proved that we value our security enough to incur some pretty substantial economic costs en route to protecting it,” says Michael O’Hanlon, a national-security analyst at the Brookings Institution.

But that willingness may have given bin Laden exactly what he wanted. While the terrorist leader began his war against the United States believing it to be a “paper tiger” that would not fight, by 2004 he had already shifted his strategic aims, explicitly comparing the U.S. fight to the Afghan incursion that helped bankrupt the Soviet Union during the Cold War. “We are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy,” bin Laden said in a taped statement. Only the smallest sign of al-Qaida would “make generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses without their achieving anything of note other than some benefits for their private corporations.” Considering that we’ve spent one-fifth of a year’s gross domestic product—more than the entire 2008 budget of the United States government—responding to his 2001 attacks, he may have been onto something.

THE SCORECARD

 

Other enemies throughout history have extracted higher gross costs, in blood and in treasure, from the United States. The Civil War and World War II produced higher casualties and consumed larger shares of our economic output. As an economic burden, the Civil War was America’s worst cataclysm relative to the size of the economy. The nonpartisan Congressional Research Service estimates that the Union and Confederate armies combined to spend $80 million, in today’s dollars, fighting each other. That number might seem low, but economic historians who study the war say the total financial cost was exponentially higher: more like $280 billion in today’s dollars when you factor in disruptions to trade and capital flows, along with the killing of 3 to 4 percent of the population. The war “cost about double the gross national product of the United States in 1860,” says John Majewski, who chairs the history department at the University of California (Santa Barbara). “From that perspective, the war on terror isn’t going to compare.”

On the other hand, these earlier conflicts—for all their human cost—also furnished major benefits to the U.S. economy. After entering the Civil War as a loose collection of regional economies, America emerged with the foundation for truly national commerce; the first standardized railroad system sprouted from coast to coast, carrying goods across the union; and textile mills began migrating from the Northeast to the South in search of cheaper labor, including former slaves who had joined the workforce. The fighting itself sped up the mechanization of American agriculture: As farmers flocked to the battlefield, the workers left behind adopted new technologies to keep harvests rolling in with less labor.

(UPDATED: New pictures from Pakistani Obama’s hideout)

World War II defense spending cost $4.4 trillion. At its peak, it sucked up nearly 40 percent of GDP, according to the Congressional Research Service. It was an unprecedented national mobilization, says Chris Hellman, a defense budget analyst at the National Priorities Project. One in 10 Americans—some 12 million people—donned a uniform during the war.

But the payoff was immense. The war machine that revved up to defeat Germany and Japan powered the U.S. out of the Great Depression and into an unparalleled stretch of postwar growth. Jet engines and nuclear power spread into everyday lives. A new global economic order—forged at Bretton Woods, N.H., by the Allies in the waning days of the war—opened a floodgate of benefits through international trade. Returning soldiers dramatically improved the nation’s skills and education level, thanks to the GI Bill, and they produced a baby boom that would vastly expand the workforce.

U.S. military spending totaled nearly $19 trillion throughout the four-plus decades of Cold War that ensued, as the nation escalated an arms race with the Soviet Union. Such a huge infusion of cash for weapons research spilled over to revolutionize civilian life, yielding quantum leaps in supercomputing and satellite technology, not to mention the advent of the Internet.

Unlike any of those conflicts, the wars we are fighting today were kick-started by a single man. While it is hard to imagine World War II without Hitler, that conflict pitted nations against each other. (Anyway, much of the cost to the United States came from the war in the Pacific.) And it’s absurd to pin the Civil War, World War I, or the Cold War on any single individual. Bin Laden’s mystique (and his place on the FBI’s most-wanted list) made him—and the wars he drew us into—unique.

By any measure, bin Laden inflicted a steep toll on America. His 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Africa caused Washington to quadruple spending on diplomatic security worldwide the following year—and to expand it from $172 million to $2.2 billion over the next decade. The 2000 bombing of the USS Cole caused $250 million in damages.(FALLOUT: U.S. Pakistani relations strained like never before)Al-Qaida’s assault against the United States on September 11, 2001, was the highest-priced disaster in U.S. history. Economists estimate that the combined attacks cost the economy $50 billion to $100 billion in lost activity and growth, or about 0.5 percent to 1 percent of GDP, and caused about $25 billion in property damage. The stock market plunged and was still down nearly 13 percentage points a year later, although it has more than made up the value since.The greater expense we can attribute to bin Laden comes from policymakers’ response to 9/11. The invasion of Afghanistan was clearly a reaction to al-Qaida’s attacks. It is unlikely that the Bush administration would have invaded Iraq if 9/11 had not ushered in a debate about Islamic extremism and weapons of mass destruction. Those two wars grew into a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign that cost $1.4 trillion in the past decade—and will cost hundreds of billions more. The government borrowed the money for those wars, adding hundreds of billions in interest charges to the U.S. debt.Spending on Iraq and Afghanistan peaked at 4.8 percent of GDP in 2008, nowhere near the level of economic mobilization in some past conflicts but still more than the entire federal deficit that year. “It’s a much more verdant, prosperous, peaceful world than it was 60 years ago,” and nations spend proportionally far less on their militaries today, says S. Brock Blomberg, a professor at Claremont McKenna College in California who specializes in the economics of terrorism. “So as bad as bin Laden is, he’s not nearly as bad as Hitler, Mussolini, [and] the rest of them.”Yet bin Laden produced a ripple effect. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars have created a world in which even non-war-related defense spending has grown by 50 percent since 2001. As the U.S. military adopted counterinsurgency doctrine to fight guerrilla wars, it also continued to increase its ability to fight conventional battles, boosting spending for weapons from national-missile defense and fighter jets to tanks and long-range bombers. Then there were large spending increases following the overhaul of America’s intelligence agencies and homeland-security programs. Those transformations cost at least another $1 trillion, if not more, budget analysts say, though the exact cost is still unknown. Because much of that spending is classified or spread among agencies with multiple missions, a breakdown is nearly impossible.It’s similarly difficult to assess the opportunity cost of the post-9/11 wars—the kinds of productive investments of fiscal and human resources that we might have made had we not been focused on combating terrorism through counterinsurgency. Blomberg says that the response to the attacks has essentially wiped out the “peace dividend” that the United States began to reap when the Cold War ended. After a decade of buying fewer guns and more butter, we suddenly ramped up our gun spending again, with borrowed money.The price of the war-fighting and security responses to bin Laden account for more than 15 percent of the national debt incurred in the last decade—a debt that is changing the way our military leaders perceive risk. “Our national debt is our biggest national-security threat,” Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters last June.All of those costs, totaled together, reach at least $3 trillion. And that’s just the cautious estimate. Stiglitz and Bilmes believe that the Iraq conflict alone cost that much. They peg the total economic costs of both wars at $4 trillion to $6 trillion, Bilmes says. That includes fallout from the sharp increase in oil prices since 2003, which is largely attributable to growing demand from developing countries and current unrest in the Middle East but was also spurred in some part by the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Bilmes and Stiglitz also count part of the 2008 financial crisis among the costs, theorizing that oil price hikes injected liquidity in global economies battling slowdowns in growth—and that helped push up housing prices and contributed to the bubble.Most important, the fight against bin Laden has not produced the benefits that accompanied previous conflicts. The military escalation of the past 10 years did not stimulate the economy as the war effort did in the 1940s—with the exception of a few large defense contractors—in large part because today’s operations spend far less on soldiers and far more on fuel. Meanwhile, our national-security spending no longer drives innovation. The experts who spoke with National Journal could name only a few advancements spawned by the fight against bin Laden, including Predator drones and improved backup systems to protect information technology from a terrorist attack or other disaster. “The spin-off effects of military technology were demonstrably more apparent in the ’40s and ’50s and ’60s,” says Gordon Adams, a national-security expert at American Univeristy.Another reason that so little economic benefit has come from this war is that it has produced less—not more—stability around the world. Stable countries, with functioning markets governed by the rule of law, make better trading partners; it’s easier to start a business, or tap national resources, or develop new products in times of tranquility than in times of strife. “If you can successfully pursue a military campaign and bring stability at the end of it, there is an economic benefit,” says economic historian Joshua Goldstein of the University of Massachusetts. “If we stabilized Libya, that would have an economic benefit.”Even the psychological boost from bin Laden’s death seems muted by historical standards. Imagine the emancipation of the slaves. Victory over the Axis powers gave Americans a sense of euphoria and limitless possibility. O’Hanlon says, “I take no great satisfaction in his death because I’m still amazed at the devastation and how high a burden he placed on us.” It is “more like a relief than a joy that I feel.” Majewski adds, “Even in a conflict like the Civil War or World War II, there’s a sense of tragedy but of triumph, too. But the war on terror … it’s hard to see what we get out of it, technologically or institutionally.”

BIN LADEN’S LEGACY

What we are left with, after bin Laden, is a lingering bill that was exacerbated by decisions made in a decade-long campaign against him. We borrowed money to finance the war on terrorism rather than diverting other national-security funding or raising taxes. We expanded combat operations to Iraq before stabilizing Afghanistan, which in turn led to the recent reescalation of the American commitment there. We tolerated an unsupervised national-security apparatus, allowing it to grow so inefficient that, as The Washington Post reported in a major investigation last year, 1,271 different government institutions are charged with counterterrorism missions (51 alone track terrorism financing), which produce some 50,000 intelligence reports each year, many of which are simply not read.We have also shelled out billions of dollars in reconstruction funding and walking-around money for soldiers, with little idea of whether it has even helped foreigners, much less the United States; independent investigations suggest as much as $23 billion is unaccounted for in Iraq alone. “We can’t account for where any of it goes—that’s the great tragedy in all of this,” Hellman says. “The Pentagon cannot now and has never passed an audit—and, to me, that’s just criminal.”It’s worth repeating that the actual cost of bin Laden’s September 11 attacks was between $50 billion and $100 billion. That number could have been higher, says Adam Rose, coordinator for economics at the University of Southern California’s National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, but for the resilience of the U.S. economy and the quick response of policymakers to inject liquidity and stimulate consumer spending. But the cost could also have been much lower, he says, if consumers hadn’t paid a fear premium—shying away from air travel and tourism in the aftermath of the attacks. “Ironically,” he says, “we as Americans had more to do with the bottom-line outcome than the terrorist attack itself, on both the positive side and the negative side.”The same is true of the nation’s decision, for so many reasons, to spend at least $3 trillion responding to bin Laden’s attacks. More than actual security, we bought a sense of action in the face of what felt like an existential threat. We staved off another attack on domestic soil. Our debt load was creeping up already, thanks to the early waves stages of baby-boomer retirements, but we also hastened a fiscal mess that has begun, in time, to fulfill bin Laden’s vision of a bankrupt America. If left unchecked, our current rate of deficit spending would add $9 trillion to the national debt over the next decade. That’s three Osamas, right there.Although Bin Laden is buried in the sea, other Islamist extremists are already vying to take his place. In time, new enemies, foreign and domestic, will rise to challenge America. What they will cost us, far more than we realize, is our choice.Visit National Journal for more political news.