Wake Up America!

Ralph Nader Was Right About Barack Obama

http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/ralph_nader_was_right_about_barack_obama_20100301/

Nader Was Right: Liberals Are Going Nowhere With Obama

http://america-hijacked.com/2009/08/12/nader-was-right-liberals-are-going-nowhere-with-obama/

After Hearing Nader Talk about AIPAC, I’m going to Vote for Nader

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ukdY-34emAw&feature=PlayList&p=57D6D8DB6C9FA3CD&index=0&playnext=1

“A Declaration of U.S. Independence from Israel” (by Chris Hedges)

http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/wake-up-america-your-government-is-hijacked-by-zionism/2008/05/23/fw-a-declaration-of-u-s-independence-from-israel-amp.php

Mossad Comes to America:  Death Squads by Invitation

James Petras

March 2010

The principle propaganda mouthpiece of the Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (PMAJO), the Daily Alert (DA), has come out in full support for Israel’s practice of extra-judicial, extra-territorial assassination.

            In the face of world-wide governmental condemnation (except from the Zionist-occupied White House and US Congress), the PMAJO slavishly backs any brutal murder committed by the Israeli secret police anywhere in the world and at anytime.  The recent assassination of Hamas leader, Mahmoud Mabhouh, in Dubai is a case in point.   The PMAJO has defended all of Mossad’s criminal actions leading up to the murder, including extensive identity theft and the stealing or falsification of passports and official documents from several European countries, presumably allied to the Zionist state.  Among the Mossad agents who entered Dubai to kill Mabhouh, twelve agents used stolen or forged British passports, three Australian, three French, one German and six Irish.  These agents assumed the identity of European citizens in order to commit murder in a sovereign nation.

            Once again the PMAJO demonstrate that its first loyalty is to the Israeli secret police, even when they violate the sovereignty of major US allies.  No doubt the PMAJO would readily support the Israeli Mossad, even if it were shown to have used U.S. documents to assassinate Mabhouh.  In fact, two of the 26 Israeli assassins, carrying fake Irish and fake British passports, are known to have entered the United States after the killing and may still be here.

            The position adopted by the Daily Alert and the PMAJO in defense of Israel’s international terrorist act followed several lines of attack, which will be discussed below. These include: (1) blaming the victim, (2) claiming that extra-judicial, extra territorial murders are legal, (3) minimizing the murder of ‘one’ individual, (4) deflecting attention from the Zionists by blaming ‘other Arab’s,  (5) favorably comparing Mossad assassinations to US killings in Afghanistan, (6) trivializing and relativizing world  condemnation, (7) citing “self-defense”, (8) praising the high tech ‘operational details’ of the assassination and (9) discrediting the Dubai police investigators rather than the Israeli perpetrators.

            Abridged articles, cited in the Daily Alert, have appeared in the op-ed pages of several US, UK, Canadian and Israeli newspapers, as well as in rightwing magazines like Forbes and Commentary.  The mainline Zionist propaganda technique is to avoid any discussion of Israel’s egregious crimes against sovereignty, due process, international law and the personal security of individuals.  In doing so, the Daily Alert adopts the propaganda techniques common to all totalitarian regimes practicing state terrorism.

(1) Blaming the Victim

            On February 22, the Daily Alert (DA) headlined two articles, which were entitled: “Killed Hamas Official betrayed by Associates says Dubai Police Chief” and “Hamas:  Assassinated Operative put Himself at Risk”.  The DA forgot to mention that Israeli secret police had been tracking their prey for over a month (having failed to assassinate him on six previous attempts) and that the Dubai Police Chief was not blaming Hamas officials but was in the process of accumulating evidence, witness statements, videos and documents proving the Israeli identities of the assassins.  Needless to say, if we were to accept the American Zionists’ argument that any leading opponent of Israel, who travels without an army of bodyguards, is “putting himself at risk”, then we must acknowledge that ours is a lawless world where Israeli hit squads are free to commit murder anywhere, any time.

(2)  Extra-Judicial, Extra territorial Murder is “Legal” (At least if the killers are Mossad)

            The February 22 and February 24 issues of the DA include two articles arguing that Israel’s practice of extra-judicial, extra-territorial murder is legal.  One article is entitled, “The Legality of Killing of Hamas Mahmoud al Mabhoud” and the other, “The Proportionate Killing of Mahmoud al Mabhoud”.  These avoid any reference to international law, which emphatically rejects cross-border, state-sponsored murders.  Legality, for the PMAJO, is whatever the Israel’s secret police apparatus deems expedient in pursuit of its goal of eliminating leaders who oppose its colonial occupation and expropriation of Palestinian lands.  If Israel’s extra-judicial, extra-territorial murder of an adversary in Dubai is legal, why not assassinate opponents in the US, Canada, England or any other country where they might travel, live, work or write?  What if the critics and opponents of Israel decided that it was now “legal” to murder Israel’s supporters wherever they lived citing the Daily Alert’s definition of legality?  We would then find ourselves in a lawless world of “legal” murder and totalitarian cross-border surveillance.

(3)  Minimizing the Murder

            The Feb 22, 24, and 25 issues of the Daily Alert deflect attention from the Mossad murder by making comparison to the hundreds of Afghan civilians killed by US drone attacks.  The claim is that “targeting individuals” is less a crime than mass killings.  The problem with this argument is that for decades Mossad has “targeted” scores of opponents overseas and killed thousands of Palestinians in the occupied territories (where they work with the domestic secret police, Shin Bet, and the military, IDF).  Moreover, this argument linking Israel’s extra judicial assassinations with US colonial killing of Afghans is hardly a defense of either.  By implicating the US in its defense of state terror, Israel is holding up the worst aspects of American imperialism as a standard for its own political behavior.  One state’s crimes are no justification for another’s.

(4)  Blaming the Arabs:  Deflecting Attention from Israel

            The DA Feb. 22 article entitled “The Assassination Heard Around the World” insinuates that the murder was a “result of a Hamas power struggle” or by one of “many Arab groups who loathes the Islamist Hamas”.

            In other words, all the forged or stolen European passports of Israeli dual citizens, and the Dubai security videos of Mossad operatives in various costumes, not to mention the jubilant affirmation by top Israeli leaders of the killing, was in reality ‘Arab tricks’.  This crude propaganda ploy by the most prominent Jewish American organization reveals their own descent into a fantasy land of self-delusion, possible only in the closed world of US Zionist politics.

(5)  Technical Proficiency

            The DA published several articles praising the technical details of the Mossad assassination in Dubai, an aspect of the operation, with which few Israel security experts would agree.  The Feb. 24 DA article entitled, “Assassination Shows Skillful Planning” chastises Israel’s critics for not recognizing the high quality of the “operational aspects” of the killings and recommends its “lessons for all intelligence services around the world”.  Like sociopaths and serial killers, US Zionists openly promote Israeli death squad techniques to all fellow state terrorists.  In the DA, professional techniques of assassination are far more important than universal moral repugnance of political murders.

(6)  Discrediting the Investigators While Defending the Perpetrators

The DA on Feb. 25 cited a long and tendentious attack on the Dubai police, published in Forbes Magazine, which ridiculed their meticulous investigations uncovering Mossad’s roles in the murder.  In this article, the Dubai authorities were condemned for uncovering Israeli involvement while not investigating the source of the murder victims’ … Iraqi passport!  Instead of encouraging the Dubai police pursuit of justice, the Daily Alert published a long diatribe implicating Dubai in the attacks of 9/11/2001, its continued trade with Iran, its ‘involvement’ in international terrorism etc.  There was no mention of Dubai’s relatively friendly position to Israel and Israelis prior to Mossad’s blatant violation of its sovereignty.

Conclusion

            The American Zionist propaganda campaign in defense of Israeli state terror and, specifically, Mossad’s murder of a Hamas leader in Dubai, relies on lies, evasions and specious legal arguments.  This “defense” violates all precepts of a civilized society as well as the most recent American federal laws prohibiting all forms of support for international terrorism.  The PMAJO can pursue its defense of Mossad’s acts of international terrorism with impunity in the US because of its power over the US Congress, the Obama White House and the American mass media.  This ensures that only its version of events, its definition of legality and its lies will be heard by legislators, echoed by Zionist activists and embellished by its solemn defenders in academic and journalistic circles.  To counter the American Zionist defense of Israel’s practice of extra-territorial, extra-judicial executions by the Mossad, we need American writers and academics to step forward.  It is time to expose their flimsy arguments, bold-face lies and audacious immorality.  It is time to speak out against their impunity, before another Israeli secret police murder takes place, possibly inside the USA itself and with the shameless complicity of Zionist accomplices.

            The authorities in Dubai have found clear evidence that the Mossad assassination team received support from European Zionists.  The hotels, air tickets and expenses were paid with credit cards issued in the US.  Two of the killers may be in the US now.  Will a time come when American Zionists, who are unconditional public defenders of Mossad killings, cross the line between propaganda for the deed to become accomplices of the deed?  The robust American Zionist defense of Mossad’s overseas assassinations does not augur well for the security of Americans in the face of Israel’s willing U.S. accomplices.

 

Do You Have to be Jewish to Report on Israel for the New York Times?

Ethan Bronner and Conflicts of Interest

http://www.counterpunch.org/cook02252010.html

Alison Weir: Media Reporting on Israel

http://counterpunch.org/weir02262010.html

The Listening Post – Media conflict of interest debate

Brzezinski on Obama, Palestine and Jewish power in White House

Peter Myers wrote:

Here’s an interesting article from Brzezinski from Foreign Affairs. He goes after Jewish influence over Obama (among other things).

From Hope to Audacity

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Foreign Affairs

A publication of: Council on Foreign Relations

Volume: 89, Issue: 1 (January/February 2010)

Abstract

Barack Obama’s foreign policy has generated more expectations than strategic breakthroughs. Three urgent issues — the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the Afghan-Pakistani challenge — will test his ability to significantly change U.S. policy.

Full Text

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65720/zbigniew-brzezinski/from-hope-to-audacity

The foreign policy of U.S. President Barack Obama can be assessed most usefully in two parts: first, his goals and decision-making system and, second, his policies and their implementation. Although one can speak with some confidence about the former, the latter is still an unfolding process.

To his credit, Obama has undertaken a truly ambitious effort to redefine the United States’ view of the world and to reconnect the United States with the emerging historical context of the twenty-first century. He has done this remarkably well. In less than a year, he has comprehensively reconceptualized U.S. foreign policy with respect to several centrally important geopolitical issues:

• Islam is not an enemy, and the “global war on terror” does not define the United States’ current role in the world;

• the United States will be a fair-minded and assertive mediator when it comes to attaining lasting peace between Israel and Palestine;

• the United States ought to pursue serious negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, as well as other issues;

• the counterinsurgency campaign in the Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan should be part of a larger political undertaking, rather than a predominantly military one;

• the United States should respect Latin America’s cultural and historical sensitivities and expand its contacts with Cuba;

• the United States ought to energize its commitment to significantly reducing its nuclear arsenal and embrace the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons;

• in coping with global problems, China should be treated not only as an economic partner but also as a geopolitical one;

• improving U.S.-Russian relations is in the obvious interest of both sides, although this must be done in a manner that accepts, rather than seeks to undo, post-Cold War geopolitical realities; and

• a truly collegial transatlantic partnership should be given deeper meaning, particularly in order to heal the rifts caused by the destructive controversies of the past few years.

For all that, he did deserve the Nobel Peace Prize. Overall, Obama has demonstrated a genuine sense of strategic direction, a solid grasp of what today’s world is all about, and an understanding of what the United States ought to be doing in it. Whether these convictions are a byproduct of his personal history, his studies, or his intuitive sense of history, they represent a strategically and historically coherent worldview. The new president, it should be added, has also been addressing the glaring social and environmental dilemmas that confront humanity and about which the United States has been indifferent for too long. But this appraisal focuses on his responses to the most urgent geopolitical challenges.

CHALLENGES TO WHITE HOUSE LEADERSHIP

Obama’s overall perspective sets the tone for his foreign-policy-making team, which is firmly centered in the White House. The president relies on Vice President Joe Biden’s broad experience in foreign affairs to explore ideas and engage in informal strategizing. National Security Adviser James Jones coordinates the translation of the president’s strategic outlook into policy, while also having to manage the largest National Security Council in history — its over-200-person staff is almost four times as large as the NSC staffs of Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and George H. W. Bush and almost ten times as large as John F. Kennedy’s. The influence of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on national security strategy has been growing steadily. Gates’ immediate task is to successfully conclude two wars, but his influence is also felt on matters pertaining to Iran and Russia. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who has the president’s ear as well as his confidence, is likewise a key participant in foreign policy decisions and is the country’s top diplomat. Her own engagement is focused more on the increasingly urgent global issues of the new century, rather than on the geopolitical ones of the recent past.

Finally, Obama’s two trusted political advisers, David Axelrod and Rahm Emanuel, who closely monitor the sensitive relationship between foreign and domestic politics, also participate in decision-making. (For example, both sat in on the president’s critical September meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.) When appropriate, policy discussions also include two experienced negotiators, George Mitchell, who conducts the Middle East peace negotiations, and Richard Holbrooke, who coordinates the regional response to the challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In effect, they are an extension of the president’s NSC-centered process.

On this team, Obama himself is the main source of the strategic direction, but, unavoidably, he is able to play this role on only a part-time basis. This is a weakness, because the conceptual initiator of a great power’s foreign policy needs to be actively involved in supervising the design of the consequent strategic decisions, in overlooking their implementation, and in making timely adjustments. Yet Obama has had no choice but to spend much of his first year in office on domestic political affairs.

As a result, his grand redefinition of U.S. foreign policy is vulnerable to dilution or delay by upper-level officials who have the bureaucratic predisposition to favor caution over action and the familiar over the innovative. Some of them may even be unsympathetic to the president’s priorities regarding the Middle East and Iran. It hardly needs to be added that officials who are not in sympathy with advocated policies rarely make good executors. Additionally, the president’s domestic political advisers inevitably tend to be more sensitive to pressures from domestic interest groups. This usually fosters a reluctance to plan for a firm follow-through on bold presidential initiatives should they suddenly encounter a foreign rebuff reinforced by powerful domestic lobbies. Netanyahu’s rejection of Obama’s public demand that Israel halt the construction of settlements on the West Bank and in East Jerusalem is a case in point.

It is still too early to make a firm assessment of the president’s determination to pursue his priorities, as most of the large issues that Obama has personally addressed involve long-range problems that call for long-term management. But three urgent issues do pose, even in the short run, an immediate and difficult test of his ability and his resolve to significantly change U.S. policy: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the Afghan-Pakistani challenge. Each of these also happens to be a sensitive issue at home.

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONUNDRUM

The first urgent challenge is, of course, the Middle East peace process. Obama stated early on that he would take the initiative on this issue and aim for a settlement in the relative near term. That position is justified historically and is in keeping with the United States’ national interest. Paralysis over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has lasted far too long, and leaving it unresolved has pernicious consequences for the Palestinians, for the region, and for the United States, and it will eventually harm Israel. It is not fashionable to say this, but it is demonstrably true that — deservedly or not — much of the current hostility toward the United States in the Middle East and the Islamic world as a whole has been generated by the bloodshed and suffering produced by this prolonged conflict. Osama bin Laden’s self-serving justifications for 9/11 are a reminder that the United States itself is also a victim of the Israeli-Palestinian conundrum.

By now, after more than 40 years of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 30 years of peace negotiations, it is quite evident that left to themselves, neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians will resolve the conflict on their own. There are many reasons for this, but the bottom line is that the Palestinians are too divided and too weak to make the critical decisions necessary to push the peace process forward, and the Israelis are too divided and too strong to do the same. As a result, a firm external initiative defining the basic parameters of a final settlement is needed to jump-start serious negotiations between the two parties. And that can only come from the United States.

But the necessary outside stimulus has not yet been forthcoming in a fashion consistent with U.S. interests and potential. In raising the issue of the settlements in the spring of 2009 but then later backing off when rebuffed by the Israeli government, the administration strengthened the hard-line elements in Israel and undercut the more moderate elements on the Palestinian side. Then, an opportunity provided by the annual UN General Assembly meeting in September to identify the United States with the overwhelming global consensus about the basic parameters of a peace settlement was squandered. Instead of seizing it, Obama merely urged the Israelis and the Palestinians to negotiate in good faith.

Yet the existing global consensus could serve as a launching pad for serious negotiations on four basic points. First, Palestinian refugees should not be granted the right of return to what is now Israel, because Israel cannot be expected to commit suicide for the sake of peace. The refugees will have to be resettled within the Palestinian state, with compensation and maybe some expression of regret for their suffering. This will be very difficult for the Palestinian national movement to swallow, but there is no alternative.

Second, Jerusalem has to be shared, and shared genuinely. The Israeli capital, of course, would be in West Jerusalem, but East Jerusalem should be the capital of a Palestinian state, with the Old City shared under some international arrangement. If a genuine compromise on Jerusalem is not part of a settlement, resentment will persist throughout the West Bank and the Palestinians will reject the peace process. Although such a compromise will understandably be difficult for the Israelis to accept, without it there cannot be a peace of reconciliation.

Third, a settlement must be based on the 1967 lines, but with territorial swaps that would allow the large settlements to be incorporated into Israel without any further reduction of the territory of the Palestinian state. That means some territorial compensation for Palestine from parts of northern and southern Israel that border the West Bank. It is important to remember that although the Israeli and Palestinian populations are almost equal in number, under the 1967 lines the Palestinian territories account for only 22 percent of the old British mandate, whereas the Israeli territories account for 78 percent.

Fourth, the United States or NATO must make a commitment to station troops along the Jordan River. Such a move would reinforce Israel’s security with strategic depth. It would reduce Israel’s fears that an independent Palestine could some day serve as a springboard for a major Arab attack on Israel.

Had Obama embraced this internationally favored blueprint for peace when he addressed the UN in September, he would have exerted enormous influence on both the Israelis and the Palestinians and instantaneously gained global support. Failing to endorse this plan was a missed opportunity, especially since the two-state solution is beginning to lose some of its credibility as a viable formula for reconciliation between the Israelis and the Palestinians and within the region. Moreover, there are indications that the United States is already losing the goodwill and renewed confidence of the Arab world that Obama won with his speech in Cairo in June.

The next few months will be critical, and the time for decisive action is running out. Perhaps as a consolation to the Palestinians (and in spite of some opposition within the White House) or perhaps as a reaffirmation of his determination to continue pressing the parties to focus on the key issues, in his UN speech Obama called for final-status negotiations to begin soon and included on the agenda four items similar to these. He also made it explicitly clear that the talks’ ultimate goal ought to be “a viable, independent Palestinian state with contiguous territory that ends the occupation that began in 1967.” It can be hoped that the president seized the moment offered by the Oslo ceremony at which the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded (which at the time of this writing had not yet occurred) to give more substance to his Middle East peace initiative. But so far, the Obama team has shown neither the tactical skill nor the strategic firmness needed to move the peace process forward.

THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE

Another urgent and potentially very dangerous challenge, with similarly huge stakes, is confronting Obama in Iran. It involves the true character of the Iranian nuclear program and Iran’s role in the region. Obama has been determined to explore the path of serious negotiations with Iran despite domestic (and some foreign) agitation and even some opposition within the second echelon of his team. Without quite saying so, he has basically downgraded the U.S. military option, although it is still fashionable to say that “all options remain on the table.” But the prospects for a successful negotiation are still quite uncertain.

Two fundamental questions complicate the situation. First, are the Iranians willing to negotiate — or even capable of doing so — seriously? The United States has to be realistic when discussing this aspect, since the clock cannot be turned back: the Iranians have the capability to enrich uranium, and they are not going to give it up. But it is still possible, perhaps through a more intrusive inspection regime, to fashion a reasonably credible arrangement that prevents weaponization. Nonetheless, even if the United States and its partners approach the negotiations with a constructive mindset, the Iranians themselves may scuttle any serious prospects for a positive outcome. Already, at the outset of the negotiating process, Iran’s credibility was undermined by the convoluted manner in which Tehran complicated a promising compromise for a cooperative Iranian-Russian-French arrangement for processing its enriched uranium.

Second, is Washington willing to engage in negotiations with some degree of patience and with sensitivity to the mentality of the other side? It would not be conducive to serious negotiations if the United States were to persist in publicly labeling Iran as a terrorist state, as a state that is not to be trusted, as a state against which sanctions or even a military option should be prepared. Doing that would simply play into the hands of the most hard-line elements in Iran. It would facilitate their appeal to Iranian nationalism, and it would narrow the cleavage that has recently emerged in Iran between those who desire a more liberal regime and those who seek to perpetuate a fanatical dictatorship.

These points must be borne in mind if and when additional sanctions become necessary. Care should be taken to make certain that the sanctions are politically intelligent and that they isolate the regime rather than unify all Iranians. Sanctions must punish those in power — not the Iranian middle class, as an embargo on gasoline would do. The unintended result of imposing indiscriminately crippling sanctions would likely be to give the Iranians the impression that the United States’ real objective is to prevent their country from acquiring even a peaceful nuclear program — and that, in turn, would fuel nationalism and outrage.

Moreover, even the adoption of politically discriminating sanctions is likely to be complicated by international constraints. China, given its dependence on Middle Eastern (and particularly Iranian) oil, fears the consequences of a sharpened crisis. The position of Russia is ambiguous since as a major energy supplier to Europe, it stands to benefit financially from a prolonged crisis in the Persian Gulf that would prevent the entrance of Iranian oil into the European market. Indeed, from the Russian geopolitical perspective, a steep rise in the price of oil as a result of a conflict in the Persian Gulf would be most economically damaging to the United States and China — countries whose global preeminence Russia tends to resent and even fear — and would make Europe even more dependent on Russian energy.

Throughout this complicated process, firm presidential leadership will be required. That is particularly so because of the presence of influential voices in the United States, both inside and outside the administration, in favor of a negotiating process that minimizes the possibility of a reasonable compromise. Prior to joining the administration, some senior second-level officials seemed to favor policies designed to force an early confrontation with Iran and even advocated joint military consultations with Israel regarding the use of force. The somewhat sensationalized manner in which the administration revealed in late September that it had been aware for months of the secret Iranian nuclear facility near Qom suggests internal disagreements over tactics.

Ultimately, a larger strategic question is at stake: Should the United States’ long-term goal be the evolution of Iran into a stabilizing power in the Middle East? To state the issue even more sharply and simply: Should its policy be designed to encourage Iran to eventually become a partner of the United States again — and even, as it was for three decades, of Israel? The wider the agenda — one that addressed regional security issues, potential economic cooperation, and so on — the greater the possibility of finding acceptable quid pro quos. Or should Iran be treated as if it is fated to remain a hostile and destabilizing power in an already vulnerable region?

As of this writing, an acceptable outcome to the negotiations is obviously still very much in doubt. Assuming they are not aborted, by early 2010 it may be possible to make a calmly calculated judgment as to whether the talks are worth continuing or whether there in fact is no room for reciprocal compromises. At that point, politically intelligent sanctions may become timely. So far, Obama has shown that he is aware of the need to combine strategic firmness with tactical flexibility; he is patiently exploring whether diplomacy can lead to an accommodation. He has avoided any explicit commitment to a precise deadline (unlike France’s grandstanding in favor of a December date), and he has not engaged in explicit threats of military action.

Those advocating a tougher stance should remember that the United States would bear the brunt of the painful consequences in the event of an attack on Iran, whether the United States or Israel launched it. Iran would likely target U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, possibly destabilizing both countries; the Strait of Hormuz could become a blazing war zone; and Americans would again pay steep prices at the gas pump. Iran is an issue regarding which, above all, Obama must trust himself to lead and not to be led. So far, he has done so.

THE AFPAK QUAGMIRE

The third urgent and politically sensitive foreign policy issue is posed by the Afghan-Pakistani predicament. Obama has moved toward abandoning some of the more ambitious, even ideological, objectives that defined the United States’ initial engagement in Afghanistan — the creation of a modern democracy, for example. But the United States must be very careful lest its engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which still has primarily and most visibly a military dimension, comes to be viewed by the Afghans and the Pakistanis as yet another case of Western colonialism and elicits from them an increasingly militant response.

Some top U.S. generals have recently stated that the United States is not winning militarily, an appraisal that ominously suggests the conflict with the Taliban could become similar to the Soviet Union’s earlier confrontation with Afghan resistance. A comprehensive strategic reassessment has thus become urgently needed. The proposal made in September by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom for an international conference on the subject was helpful and timely; the United States was wise to welcome it. But to be effective, any new strategy has to emphasize two key elements. First, the Afghan government and NATO should seek to engage locally in a limited process of accommodation with receptive elements of the Taliban. The Taliban are not a global revolutionary or terrorist movement, and although they are a broad alliance with a rather medieval vision of what Afghanistan ought to be, they do not directly threaten the West. Moreover, they are still very much a minority phenomenon that ultimately can be defeated only by other Afghans (helped economically and militarily by the United States and its NATO allies), a fact that demands a strategy that is more political than military.

Additionally, the United States needs to develop a policy for gaining the support of Pakistan, not just in denying the Taliban a sanctuary in Pakistan but also in pressuring the Taliban in Afghanistan to accommodate. Given that many Pakistanis may prefer a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan to a secular Afghanistan that leans toward Pakistan’s archrival, India, the United States needs to assuage Pakistan’s security concerns in order to gain its full cooperation in the campaign against the irreconcilable elements of the Taliban. In this regard, the support of China could be helpful, particularly considering its geopolitical stake in regional stability and its traditionally close ties with Islamabad.

It is likely that before this appraisal hits the newsstands, Obama will have announced a more comprehensive strategy for attaining a politically acceptable outcome to the ongoing conflict — and one that U.S. allies are also prepared to support. His approach so far has been deliberate. He has been careful to assess both the military and the political dimensions of the challenge and also to take into account the views of U.S. allies. Nothing would be worse for NATO than if one part of the alliance (western Europe) left the other part of the alliance (the United States) alone in Afghanistan. Such a fissure over NATO’s first campaign initially based on Article 5, the collective defense provision, would probably spell the end of the alliance.

How Obama handles these three urgent and interrelated issues — the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the Iranian dilemma, and the Afghan-Pakistani conflict — will determine the United States’ global role for the foreseeable future. The consequences of a failed peace process in the Middle East, a military collision with Iran, and an intensifying military engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan all happening simultaneously could commit the United States for many years to a lonely and self-destructive conflict in a huge and volatile area. Eventually, that could spell the end of the United States’ current global preeminence.

KEY STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS

The president, in addition to coping with these immediate challenges, has indicated his intent to improve three key geopolitical relationships of the United States: with Russia, with China, and with Europe. Each involves longer-term dilemmas but does not require crisis management now. Each has its own peculiarities: Russia is a former imperial power with revisionist ambitions but declining social capital; China is a rising world power that is modernizing itself at an astonishing pace but deliberately downplaying its ambitions; Europe is a global economic power devoid of either military clout or political will. Obama has rightly indicated that the United States needs to collaborate more closely with each of them.

Hence, the administration decided to “reset” the United States’ relationship with Russia. But that slogan is confusing, and it is not yet clear that Washington’s wishful thinking about Moscow’s shared interests on such matters as Iran is fully justified. Nonetheless, the United States must think strategically about its long-term relationship with Russia and pursue a two-track policy: it has to cooperate with Russia whenever doing so is mutually beneficial, but in a way that is also responsive to historical reality. The age of closed empires is over, and Russia, for the sake of its own future, will eventually have to accept this.

Seeking to expand cooperation with Russia does not mean condoning Russia’s subordination of Georgia (through which the vital Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline passes, providing Europe with access to Central Asian energy) or its intimidation of Ukraine (an industrial and agricultural heartland of the former Soviet Union). Either move would be a giant step backward. Each would intensify Russia’s imperial nostalgia and central Europe’s security fears, not to mention increase the possibility of armed conflicts. Yet so far, the Obama administration has been quite reluctant to provide even purely defensive arms to Georgia (in contrast to Russia’s provision of offensive weaponry to Venezuela), nor has it been sufficiently active in encouraging the EU to be more responsive to Ukraine’s European aspirations. Fortunately, Vice President Biden’s fall 2009 visit to Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic did reaffirm the United States’ long-term interest in political pluralism within the former Soviet space and in a cooperative relationship with a truly postimperial Russia. And it should always be borne in mind that the survival of the former makes the latter more likely.

A longer-term effort to engage China in a more forthcoming approach to global problems is also needed. China is, as it has proclaimed, “rising peacefully,” and unlike Russia, it is patiently self-confident. But one can also argue that China is rising somewhat selfishly and needs to be drawn more broadly into constructive cooperation on global economic, financial, and environmental decisions. It also has growing political influence over geopolitical issues that affect core U.S. interests: North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and even the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Thus, Obama’s decision to develop a top-level bilateral U.S.-Chinese relationship has been timely. Cultivating at the presidential-summit level a de facto geopolitical G-2 (not to be confused with proposals for an economic G-2), highlighted by Obama’s November visit to China, is helping develop an increasingly significant strategic dialogue. The leaders of the United States and China recognize that both countries have a major stake in an effectively functioning world system. And they appear to appreciate the historic potential and the respective national interests inherent in such a bilateral relationship.

Paradoxically, despite Obama’s expressed desire, there seem to be fewer prospects in the near future for a strategically significant enhancement of the United States’ relationship with its closest political, economic, and military partner: Europe. Obama’s predecessor left a bitter legacy there, which Obama has greatly redressed in terms of public opinion. But genuine strategic cooperation on a global scale is not possible with a partner that not only has no defined and authoritative political leadership but also lacks an internal consensus regarding its world role.

Hence, Obama’s intent to reignite the Atlantic partnership is necessarily limited to dialogues with the three key European states with genuine international clout: the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. But the utility of such dialogues is reduced by the personal and political differences among these countries’ leaders — not to mention the British prime minister’s grim political prospects, the French president’s preoccupation with personal celebrity, and the German chancellor’s eastward gaze. The emergence of a unified and therefore influential European worldview, with which Obama could effectively engage, seems unlikely anytime soon.

DOMESTIC IMPEDIMENTS

What then, on balance, can be said of Obama’s foreign policy? So far, it has generated more expectations than strategic breakthroughs. Nonetheless, Obama has significantly altered U.S. policies regarding the three most urgent challenges facing the country. But as a democracy, the United States has to base its foreign policy decisions on domestic political consent. And unfortunately for Obama, gaining that support is becoming more difficult because of three systemic weaknesses that impede the pursuit of an intelligent and decisive foreign policy in an increasingly complex global setting.

The first is that foreign policy lobbies have become more influential in U.S. politics. Thanks to their access to Congress, a variety of lobbies — some financially well endowed, some backed by foreign interests — have been promoting, to an unprecedented degree, legislative intervention in foreign-policy making. Now more than ever, Congress not only actively opposes foreign policy decisions but even imposes some on the president. (The pending legislation on sanctions against Iran is but one example.) Such congressional intervention, promoted by lobbies, is a serious handicap in shaping a foreign policy meant to be responsive to the ever-changing realities of global politics and makes it more difficult to ensure that U.S. — not foreign — interests are the point of departure.

The second, documented by a 2009 RAND study, pertains to the deepening ideological cleavage that is reducing the prospects for effective bipartisanship in foreign policy. The resulting polarization not only makes a bipartisan foreign policy less likely, but it also encourages the infusion of demagogy into policy conflicts. And it poisons the public discourse. Still worse, personal vilification and hateful, as well as potentially violent, rhetoric are becoming widespread in that realm of political debate that is subject to neither fact checking nor libel laws: the blogosphere.

Last but not least, of the large democratic countries, the United States has one of the least informed publics when it comes to global affairs. Many Americans, as various National Geographic surveys have shown, are not even familiar with basic global geography. Their knowledge of other countries’ histories and cultures is not much better. How can a public unfamiliar with geography or foreign history have even an elementary grasp of, say, the geopolitical dilemmas that the United States faces in Afghanistan and Pakistan? With the accelerating decline in the circulation of newspapers and the trivialization of once genuinely informative television reporting, reliable and timely news about critical global issues is becoming less available to the general public. In that context, demagogically formulated solutions tend to become more appealing, especially in critical moments.

Together, these three systemic weaknesses are complicating efforts to gain public support for a rational foreign policy attuned to the complexity of the global dilemmas facing the United States. Obama’s instinct is to lead by conciliation. That has been his political experience, and it has obviously been the key to his electoral success. Conciliation, backed by personal inspiration and the mass mobilization of populist hopes, is indeed the most important impetus for moving a policy agenda forward in a large democracy. In campaigning for the presidency, Obama proved that he was a master both of social conciliation and of political mobilization. But he has not yet made the transition from inspiring orator to compelling statesman. Advocating that something happen is not the same as making it happen.

In the tough realities of world affairs, leadership also requires an unrelenting firmness in overcoming foreign opposition, in winning the support of friends, in negotiating seriously when necessary with hostile states, and in gaining grudging respect even from those governments that the United States sometimes has an interest in intimidating. To these ends, the optimal moment for blending national aspirations with decisive leadership is when the personal authority of the president is at its highest — usually during the first year in office. For President Obama, alas, that first year has been dominated by the economic crisis and the struggle over health-care reform. The next three years may thus be more difficult. For the United States’ national interest, but also for humanity’s sake, that makes it truly vital for Obama to pursue with tenacious audacity the soaring hopes he unleashed.

Ahmadinejad once again fails to call for the annihilation of Israel, despite what you heard on CNN (by Juan Cole)

http://www.juancole.com/2010/02/ahmadinejad-once-again-fails-to-call.html

Ahmadinejad did not threaten to ‘wipe Israel off the map’:

http://america-hijacked.com/2010/02/26/ahmadinejad-did-not-threaten-to-wipe-israel-off-the-map/

US Visits to Israel Seen Trying to Prevent Attack on Iran

http://news.antiwar.com/2010/03/01/us-visits-to-israel-seen-trying-to-prevent-attack-on-iran/

A flurry of US official visits to Israel recently, to culminate with next week’s high profile visit by Vice President Joe Biden, are aimed at reassuring the Middle East nation about America’s opposition to Iran, and to stave off a potential Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear sites.

http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/Display_news.asp?section=Local_News&subsection=Qatar+News&month=February2010&file=Local_News201002287121.xml

British journalist warns of Israeli plot to draw US into war with Iran
Web posted at: 2/28/2010 7:1:21
Source ::: THE PENINSULA

DOHA: A famous British journalist and author has warned that Israel wants to draw Washington into a war with Iran.

But the US is not falling into the Israeli trap and every time the issue comes up, the White House dispatches a senior advisor from the national security department to Tel Aviv to say no to war.

Patrick Seale who is here attending the Monaco Club conference told reporters on the sidelines of the event that Israel believes that if it wages a war against Iran on its own public opinion would force the White House to intervene, especially if Tehran targets US military interests in the Gulf.

The prospects of a war in the region do not bode well for the GCC. Many countries believe that Tel Aviv wants the GCC countries to be a target of Iran in the eventually of a war.

Israel’s thinking is that being dragged into a war, the wealthy Gulf region which is also the cradle of Arab civilisation would get weakened.

Seale argued that Israel thinks that it can literally get away doing anything, especially as Russians are busy elsewhere — with Ukraine and Central Asia.

“This is the real danger we face,” said the British scribe who is based in France.

It is a matter of immense regret that the US is weak when it comes to Israel and the Europeans as well as Arabs remain divided on the Issue, he added.

——————————————————–

That was a war council in Damascus

http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100301/OPINION/702289930/1006

Sunday, February 28, 2010 6:57 AM
From: “Stephen Sniegoski”

Friends,

While we are explicitly told by anti-war commentators such as Juan Cole that
the only type of American Jews pushing for war on Iran are right-wing ones,
it is apparent that Jewish liberals such as Richard Cohen are also in the
pro-war camp. (See: http://tinyurl.com/JuanColeonIsraelLobby)
Now Cohen, just like a number of rightist neocons, does not directly call
for an attack on Iran, but rather advocates a policy that certainly would
lead in that direction. Specifically, he says that it is time for Obama to
start acting “crazy” toward Iran because of the alleged failure of
diplomacy.
(Iran and the Crazy Factor, Washington Post, February 23,
http://tinyurl.com/cohencrazy )

Such a recommendation of craziness is predicated on Cohen’s belief that
Ahmadinejad and the Iranian leadership in general are crazy and that the
only way to fight crazy people is by likewise acting crazy: “fight crazy
with crazy.” Cohen writes: “I have no idea whether Ahmadinejad merely
acts crazy or is crazy. I do know, though, that Iran seems intent on getting
nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. I also know that nothing
the United States and its allies have done has dissuaded Ahmadinejad (or the
mullahs or the Revolutionary Guard Corps) from his goal. It may be time for
Barack Obama, ever the soul of moderation, to borrow a tactic from Richard
Nixon and fight crazy with crazy. The way things are going, it would be
crazy not to.”

It is rather odd that Cohen would pick Nixon’s advocacy of madness as a
model for emulation, since Nixon, and especially his bellicosity, were
hardly admired by liberals such as Cohen during his presidency. Moreover,
Cohen acknowledges that Nixon’s crazy strategy “while cunning, didn’t work
on the North Vietnamese.” Desiring the adoption of a previously failed
strategy is hard to fathom.

Furthermore, Nixon’s rationale for acting crazy would not seem to apply in
the milieu depicted by Cohen. Nixon actually predicated his madman strategy
on the rationality of his adversaries. The rational person, presumably,
would make some concessions to the madman to avoid destruction. However,
Cohen claims that the Iranians are irrational. There is no reason to think
that acting crazy would cause them to turn rational, but rather that it
would cause them to act out their craziness, which in the particular
situation that exists in the Middle East today would mean an all-out war.
To try to put Cohen’s argument in a rational context, this must mean that he
sees a war with Iran at the current time to be preferable to one in the
future when Iran would have nuclear weapons and which would likely involve
Israel.

The reasons Cohen gives for taking a “crazy” stance toward Iran have little
to do with any threat Iran poses to the United States, but actually seem to
revolve around Israel and Jews. Cohen cites Ahmadinejad’s “Holocaust
denial” and his call for Zionism to be “wiped out.” Cohen acknowledges
that these words might have nothing to do with the launching of war-”On the
face of it, these statements could be nothing more than the ranting of a
demagogue intent on appeasing the mob.” But then he points out that Israel,
having experienced Hitler’s anti-Semitic words leading to the Holocaust,
would naturally think otherwise. “Israel, of all countries,” he asserts,
“has little faith in the rationality of mankind. It simply knows better. So
the question of whether Ahmadinejad is playing the madman or really is a
madman is not an academic exercise. It has a real and frightening immediacy
that too often, in too many precincts, gets belittled as a form of
paranoia.”

So it might be understandable for Israel to be terrified of a nuclear Iran,
at least according to Cohen, but what about a threat to the United States?
“An Iranian bomb,” Cohen contends, “is not a matter that concerns only
Israel. It would upend the balance of power throughout the Middle East and
encourage radical/terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas to
ratchet up their war against Israel. Other Middle East nations, not content
to rely on an American nuclear umbrella, would seek their own bombs. An
unstable region would go nuclear.” It is telling that even in purportedly
dealing with threats to countries other than Israel, Cohen almost
immediately gets back to threats to Israel by writing that a nuclear Iran
would “encourage radical/terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and
Hamas to ratchet up their war against Israel.” For Cohen, Israel’s safety
is certainly on his mind, first and foremost.

But regarding the US, the dangers presumably consist of countries in the
unstable Middle East obtaining nuclear weapons. These developments, while
undesirable, are hardly dire threats to American national security. And we
are only dealing with the chance of Iran developing actual nuclear weapons,
though it is more likely that it will develop nuclear capability. And in
the most extreme case with all major countries in the Middle East obtaining
nuclear weapons, it is not even clear whether such a development would lead
to a terrible war or whether it might actually enhance regional stability.
Certainly, the existence of nuclear weapons served to prevent a major war
between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. And the
possession of nuclear weapons have not caused India and Pakistan to be more
aggressive toward each other. Of course, the loss of its nuclear monopoly
would weaken Israel’s position in the Middle East.

What Cohen does not even make an attempt to show is that in regard to
American security the danger of not attacking Iran outweighs the terrible
impact of a war in the Middle East, which would be a likely result from his
recommendation that Obama act crazy. It would seem to be a general
consensus that a war on Iran at the present time would have terrible
consequences for the already-battered world economy, which would certainly
affect the US. It should be pointed out that the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, reflecting what has been the
consensus view of the American military leadership, has expressed strong
opposition to any military strike on Iran and desires the continuation of
peaceful diplomacy.
http://www.thenation.com/blogs/dreyfuss/513886/admiral_mullen_no_attack_on_iran

In sum, it would appear that the liberal Richard Cohen does not differ
substantially from his co-religionists on the Right in his militant position
toward Iran. And there is nothing particularly new about this. Cohen had
supported the war on Iraq and only later recanted, after the war had become
unpopular, but included Israel in his explanation for his earlier pro-war
position: “Saddam Hussein was a beast who had twice
invaded his neighbors, had killed his own people with abandon and posed
a threat – and not just a theoretical one – to Israel.” (“The Lingo Of
Vietnam,”
Washington Post, November 21, 2006, p. A-27)
It would seem therefore that
the safety of Israel always looms very large in the minds of even liberal
Jews.

Transparent Cabal Website:
http://home.comcast.net/~transparentcabal/

Amazon listing of The Transparent Cabal:
http://tiny.cc/zNV06

Best,
Stephen Sniegoski
_______________________________________________________________________

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/22/AR2010022203
530.html

Washington Post

Iran and the crazy factor

By Richard Cohen
Tuesday, February 23, 2010; A19

A question relating to Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program: Is Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad crazy like Adolf Hitler, or is he crazy like,
of all people, Richard Nixon?

Nixon had a term for his own sort of craziness: “I call it the Madman
Theory, Bob,” he said to his aide H.R. “Bob” Haldeman during the 1968
presidential campaign. Nixon was talking about how he would deal with the
Vietnam War. “I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point
where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them
that, ‘For God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can’t
restrain him when he’s angry — and he has his hand on the nuclear button.’
” The strategy, while cunning, didn’t work on the North Vietnamese. Maybe
they were crazier than Nixon.

Ahmadinejad is some version of crazy, too. His denial of the Holocaust is
either proof of a drooling sort of insanity or a kind of Nixonian craziness
designed to keep enemies and adversaries off balance: What will this guy do
next?

In tandem with his Holocaust denial, Ahmadinejad has repeatedly urged the
destruction of Israel. While some experts differ on the precise translations
of his words, his general goal is clear. What’s not clear, though, is
whether he is expressing a wish or making a vow: “The Zionist regime will be
wiped out.” “The Zionist regime is on its way out.” “This regime’s days are
numbered.” “Thanks to God, your wish will soon be realized, and this germ of
corruption will be wiped off the face of the world.” I could go on and on
as, in fact, Ahmadinejad has.

On the face of it, these statements could be nothing more than the ranting
of a demagogue intent on appeasing the mob. After all, Ahmadinejad has to
know that any attempt to convert his rhetoric into action would be met by
force. Israel is a nuclear power, and it will not go down without a fight.
The Iranians cannot be that crazy. They are, in a Nixonian way, merely
trying to impress. Maybe.

But the belief that the world operates rationally is itself irrational. The
example of Hitler both instructs and warns. The Nazi leader was not just an
anti-Semite who actually believed his insane theories; he also made
decisions that were in themselves crazy. For example, why did he declare war
on the United States after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor? Why did he
invade the Soviet Union before he had defeated Britain? In both cases, he
had his reasons. And in both cases, his reasons were crazy.

Israel, of all countries, has little faith in the rationality of mankind. It
simply knows better. So the question of whether Ahmadinejad is playing the
madman or really is a madman is not an academic exercise. It has a real and
frightening immediacy that too often, in too many precincts, gets belittled
as a form of paranoia. For instance, when Israeli leaders warn that they
might take preemptive action against Iran — say, an attempt to bomb its
nuclear facilities as they did in Iraq in 1981 — it is dismissed as
irresponsible saber-rattling. Former national security adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski even suggested that if Israel tried such a thing, the United
States might have to back it down with force. The Brzezinski Doctrine is
refreshing in its perverse boldness: We shoot our friends to defend our
enemies.

An Iranian bomb is not a matter that concerns only Israel. It would upend
the balance of power throughout the Middle East and encourage
radical/terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas to ratchet up
their war against Israel. Other Middle East nations, not content to rely on
an American nuclear umbrella, would seek their own bombs. An unstable region
would go nuclear. (It speaks volumes about Middle Eastern reality and
hypocrisy that Egypt serenely lives with an Israeli bomb but breaks out in
diplomatic hives at the prospect of an Iranian one.) Have a good night’s
sleep.

I have no idea whether Ahmadinejad merely acts crazy or is crazy. I do know,
though, that Iran seems intent on getting nuclear weapons and the missiles
to deliver them. I also know that nothing the United States and its allies
have done has dissuaded Ahmadinejad (or the mullahs or the Revolutionary
Guard Corps) from his goal. It may be time for Barack Obama, ever the soul
of moderation, to borrow a tactic from Richard Nixon and fight crazy with
crazy. The way things are going, it would be crazy not to.

Iran, Syria mock U.S. policy; Ahmadinejad speaks of Israel’s ‘annihilation’

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022505089.html

Ahmadinejad once again fails to call for the annihilation of Israel, despite what you heard on CNN (by Juan Cole)

http://www.juancole.com/2010/02/ahmadinejad-once-again-fails-to-call.html

——————————-

AIPAC lackey Hillary Clinton still pushing sanctions against Iran for Israel

http://america-hijacked.com/2010/02/15/aipac-lackey-hillary-clinton-still-pushing-sanctions-against-iran-for-israel/

How talking about the US (‘A Clean Break’) threat against Syria and Iran which the Iraq quagmire was based on:

A Clean Break

http://neoconzionistthreat.blogspot.com/2008/02/clean-break.html

The ‘A Clean Break’ is mentioned again in the following write-up by Dr. Stephen Sniegoski (whose ‘The Transparent Cabal’ book provides the best historical account of how/why we got into the Iraq quagmire in order to secure the realm for Israel in accordance with the ‘A Clean Break’):

Fragmentation of Iraq Was Israel’s Strategy

http://america-hijacked.com/2010/02/18/fragmentation-of-iraq-was-israels-strategy/

Juan Cole on Israel and its Lobby: Ideological Blinders or Hidden Meaning

http://america-hijacked.com/2010/02/25/juan-cole-on-israel-and-its-lobby-ideological-blinders-or-hidden-meaning-3/

http://tinyurl.com/JuanColeonIsraelLobby